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INTRODUCTION

Most participants in the Symposium on New Governance and the
Transformation of Law found the "new governance" phenomenon
attractive and important, but as David and Louise Trubek note, they
were not entirely comfortable with it.
One anxiety concerned the difficulty of defining the phenomenon
and situating it in the universe of familiar political ideas and
institutions. The term gets applied to a variety of institutions. To some
people, these institutions do not fit snugly into any familiar political
categories. To others, they bear a suspicious resemblance to categories
that no longer inspire optimism-for example, Romantic
communitarianism, corporatism, or "new public management."
The other prominent anxiety concerned the relation of new

governance regimes to liberal values of justice and democracy. To
some, new governance seems to depend on deferring or compromising
such values and, in doing so, to put vulnerable people at risk.
In order to address these anxieties, we have to decide whether the
conditions that give rise to them should be counted as evidence against

new governance or as defective implementations of it. Do the criticisms
imply rejection of new governance in general, or do they favor an
improved version of it?
If our goal is to contribute to improved practice, we should adopt
the interpretation that makes new governance as good as it can be. I
think the most promising interpretation is the Democratic
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Experimentalist one inspired by John Dewey. Dewey thought of
democracy as a process of collaborative discovery, rather than a
process controlled by the determinate will of the citizenry.2 He thought
of the citizenry not as a unitary public, but as multiple publics defined
by their relations to different problems and held together by an
overlapping consensus. He called for government to treat public
policies as "experimental in the sense that they will be entertained
subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences
they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision
in the light of observed consequences." 3 In such a polity, the most
salient forms of accountability do not involve showing that official
conduct conforms to some previously enacted mandate, but
demonstration and transparent explanation and assessment of conduct in
the light of general public aims.
Most of the new governance anxieties seem to arise from
departures from this Deweyan framework rather than instantiations of
it. In support of this claim, I will discuss, first, the background
conditions of new governance, and then the relation of new governance
to both justice and democracy.
A. BackgroundPreconditions
For what kind of problems or circumstances is new governance
most promising? At the conference, Robert Ahdieh associated new
governance with a strong convergence of interests.' Edwin Rubin
associated it with dispositions toward solidarity or honor.' Grdinne de
Bdirca associated it with circumstances of extreme urgency.'
While all these factors may be favorable to the successful use of
new governance, the Deweyan view suggests that the most important
considerations are interdependence and uncertainty.
Interdependence means that people share the effects of a common
problem or that their collaboration is necessary to remedy it. The
primary unit of public activity in the Deweyan polity is a (not the)
2.

See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN
(1946).
3.
Id. at 203.
4.
Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the
Regulatory State (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 0986, Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1522127.
5.
Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of New
Public Governance,2010 Wis. L. REv. 535.
6.
GrAinne de Bilrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An
Introduction,2010 Wis. L. REv. 227.
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public, and a public is constituted by the relation of its members to a
practical problem.'
Uncertainty means that the members cannot, either individually or
collectively, determine with confidence what the appropriate response
to the problem is prior to intervening. Uncertainty takes one or more of
three forms. The public or its representatives do not know what the best
immediate intervention is. They fear that the circumstances will change
quickly enough that the currently effective intervention will become
obsolete before it can be centrally recalibrated. Or effective
intervention depends so much on local circumstances that it must be
customized. In these conditions, the capacity of new governance for
drawing on stakeholder knowledge-both for continuous adaptation and
for contextualization-is especially attractive.
New governance depends on some level of voluntary cooperation,
but it is a little misleading to see the viability of its projects simply as a
function of the degree of shared interests. In order to cooperate
voluntarily, stakeholders must expect gains from the collaboration. But
if the gains are large enough, they can compensate for losses. Thus,
interests do not need to be entirely convergent, and in some areas of
apparent new governance success (for example, schools in Kentucky
and New York City and endangered species preservation in various
places), stakeholders with substantial conflicting interests have
collaborated effectively.
Moreover, the relevant interests are not necessarily exogenous to
the intervention. The regime itself may induce people to collaborate by
changing their background alternatives. Land developers found an
interest in collaborating with environmentalists to create Habitat
Conservation Plans, but only after the Endangered Species Act
precluded them from developing in the absence of such plans.' And of
course, people's perceptions of their interests are susceptible to change
in the course of deliberation.
We tend to alternate between hierarchical and horizontal
perspectives in talking about new governance. From the hierarchical
perspective, we think of a government with authority to impose a
solution but which, because of uncertainty, finds that it must employ a
regime that induces and enables local actors to derive one.
Alternatively, we can think of the situation horizontally-say from the
point of view of a group of peers (individuals, firms, states) who want
7.
DEWEY, supra note 2, at 3-36. Grdinne de B6rca also emphasized
interdependence. See de Bdrca, supranote 6.
8.
Bradley C.
Karkkainen,
Information-Forcing Regulation and
Environmental Governance, in NEW GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND THE US 293, 301-04
(Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
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to commit themselves to joint action but, because of uncertainty, cannot
contractually specify their mutual obligations and must thus set up a
regime for ongoing adaptation.
In practice, the distinction between these two situations blurs. In
the hierarchical situation, the government may wind up deferring to or
supporting a peer organization such as the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations. 9 In the horizontal situation, the peers may contract with or
create an encompassing organization to implement and enforce its
norms-for example, the Leafy Green Marketing Agreement regime
that enforces food safety norms in California"o or the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission that regulates tuna fishing practices that
threaten dolphins."
So the distinction between the hierarchical and horizontal
perspective may be largely formal. A distinction with more practical
significance concerns the degree of freedom that the designers of the
regime have in revising background norms. In designing the
Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Congress could change the default
rule (from freedom to develop to prohibition of development) in a way
that substantially redistributes power. In other contexts-international
trade regimes may be examples-the default rules are likely to remain
unchanged. That does not necessarily mean that weaker parties cannot
gain from collaboration or that the outcomes of deliberation will be
simple functions of default power. But it does limit the options of the
designers.
Understood in this way, new governance regimes do not resemble
Romantic communitarianism, corporatism, or new public management.
Unlike communitarianism, they can accommodate a good deal of
conflict of interests. Unlike corporatism, they do not treat groups or
group interests as fixed, and they do not create a rigid monopolistic
structure of group representation. And unlike new public management,
they deny that, in the situations they address, performance goals and
metrics can be specified hierarchically without ongoing stakeholder
participation or that performance-based incentives are sufficient for
success without more direct efforts to facilitate learning.

9.
See generally JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AFTER THREE-MILE ISLAND (1994).
10.
See generally CAL. DEP'T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREEN
PRODUCTS
HANDLER
MARKETING
AGREEMENT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/members/resources.asp (select "LGMA Marketing
Agreement).
11.
See Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect
the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Coflict, 12 GEO.
INT'L EVNTL. L. REv. 1 (1999).
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B. Justice
New governance is a form of proceduralism. The legitimacy of the
solutions that emerge from its deliberations is a function of basic
background constraints-eligibility norms for participation, rules of
deliberative process, and default rules that dictate what happens in the
absence of agreement. These norms have to meet some test of fairness.
But assuming fair constraints of this sort, the legitimacy of the
solution the deliberations produce rests mainly on the agreement of the
deliberators. The basic uncertainty condition for invoking new
governance means that we have no more specific criteria for assessing
the legitimacy of the specific solution.
It could be argued that this fact precludes the use of new
governance to address issues that implicate issues of justice. If true, this
would be a very damaging claim, since justice concerns are integral to
key positions on many pressing social problems. Even the issues
involving coordination standards of the sort Robert Ahdieh focuses on
can implicate questions of justice. For example, agricultural grading
standards are the kind of norms that one usually thinks of as
coordination signals, but small farmers argue passionately that the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's rules for designating food as "organic"
favor big agribusiness at their expense. 12 And justice claims are
prominent in the social policy areas such as environment, health,
safety, education, and discrimination where new governance is
commonly applied.
There are at least two versions of the claim that new governance is
contraindicated where issues of justice have not been settled. First, it is
sometimes claimed that, as a matter of fact, people cannot make
deliberative progress-that is, cannot arrive at productive agreementswith respect to such issues. It seems far too soon to arrive at such a
conclusion on the basis of current evidence. The evidence is mixed, but
there are surely enough examples of apparent deliberative success to
demand that the question be treated as open. Questions of distributive
fairness are central, for example, to the widely admired "participatory
budgeting" regime in several Brazilian municipalities. 13 Although his
projects do not involve direct governance, James Fishkin has

12.
Brian Chasnoff, What's in a Word? Small FarmersSay USDA Has Stolen
the Word "Organic,"SAN ANTONIO CURRENT, May 26, 2005.
13.
LEONARDO AVRITZER, PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC
BRAZIL 83-115 (2009).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

732

demonstrated systematically the possibility of deliberative progress over
a broad range of issues freighted with fairness concerns.14
Another version of the claim is that new governance sometimes
treats issues as uncertain-and hence a subject for deliberation-when
in fact they ought to be treated as certain, and hence a constraint on
deliberation. Some issues need to be regarded as part of the settled
framework of deliberation. No one should be asked to deliberate about
whether they are entitled to basic civility or whether certain types of
discrimination against them are permissible.
But this second type of critique should be pursued retail rather than
wholesale. The argument should show that the answer is so powerfully
apparent or so generally accepted that it does not belong on the
deliberative agenda.
Lisa Alexander's discussion of public-housing replacement is a
good example." She criticizes the deliberative process because it left
open the extent to which displaced residents would have priority on
replacement units and the outcome fell considerably short of the right of
return she favors.' 6 Her position requires her to defend the idea of a
right of return normatively as an entitlement that can be established and
defined without the need for the kind of contextualization and
adaptability that calls for new governance deliberation.
If she is right, her argument points to an important condition for
the design of the deliberative process she analyzes. However, I do not
think the failure to observe this condition in the case she studied
indicates a general disadvantage of new governance. The danger that
matters that should be treated as settled constraints will be mis-assigned
to the deliberative agenda seems no greater than the danger that issues
that should be submitted to deliberation will be imposed as constraints.
Think, for example, of the critiques of the categorical application of
constitutional search-and-seizure norms in the public-housing context in
a way that some feel were insensitive to the practical problems of crime
control in this context.
Lisa Alexander and Amy Cohen quote me as saying that
Experimentalist deliberation tends to "bracket" distributive issues." I
did say this, but it is wrong, or at least misleading. First, it conflates
JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
106-96 (2009).
15.
This discussion appeared in a previously published article presented at the
Symposium. Lisa Alexander, Stakeholder Participationin New Governance: Lessons
From Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 117 (2009).
16.
See generally id.
17.
Id. at 133; Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on
Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 357.
14.

AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION
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two different questions. One is the question just mentioned of which
issues will be treated as settled constraints and which ones will be
treated as subjects for deliberation. The other is the question of how,
within the deliberative process, intractable disagreement will be
handled.
At the process design level, some issues have to be designated as
settled, but as I have suggested, I do not think that this category of
issues is usefully described in terms of justice or distributive fairness.
Within the deliberative process, a basic technique is to put aside
("bracket") the most intractable issues and focus on matters where
more common ground appears. The hope is that progress can be made
without fully addressing the hard issues, or that discussion of the other
issues will lead to a reframing of the hard ones in ways that will make
them more tractable. Think, for example, the progress that occurred in
discussions of the death penalty when discussion was diverted away
from issues the ultimate legitimacy of state killing toward a discussion
of the reliability of the process of guilt determination. But this kind of
bracketing does not have to permanently preempt discussion.
Moreover, I do not think that the issues that get bracketed in this way
are especially likely to be distributive ones.
A final point needs to be made to put these matters in perspective.
Which issues seem settled and which seem open for deliberation may
vary depending on what part of the system we are in. Experimentalists
often think of institutions as nested hierarchies, with deliberative
processes going on at each level. Deliberation at any given level can
provisionally settle an issue and take it off the agenda for the levels
below, but they can remain matters for deliberation at higher levels. In
a federal state, issues may be considered settled within a member state
that are matters for deliberation at the federal level, and issues
considered settled at the federal level may be open within international
regimes. For example, the permissibility of expansive prohibition of
"hate speech" seems fairly settled within Germany and the United
States, but in different ways. At least within these countries, it might be
plausible to treat the issues as settled for some purposes in stakeholder
regimes, for example, in community policing. Clearly, however, the
issues could not be treated as settled within an international human
rights regime that both countries participated in.
So when a critic asserts that that a particular fairness precept like
the right of return of displaced public-housing residents should be
treated as a constraint, the plausibility of her argument may depend on
what level she is discussing. It might be that such a right is particularly
well-supported in a particular locality given its experiences or needs or
culture but less so at the national, and still less at the global, level.
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C. Democracy

Those-including in this conference, Mark Dawson-who
associate new governance with a "managerialism" characterized by
and
expert domination, decision-making behind-closed-doors,
not
adopting
the
interpretation
Balkanization among technical fields are
that makes new governance as good as it can be.'
On the Deweyan interpretation, new governance is committed to
decision-making by diverse and encompassing stakeholder groups and
to transparency. Dewey argued vigorously that expertise would be
ineffective without the kind of street-level local knowledge that only lay
stakeholders could provide and insisted that democracy required a kind
of expertise that would develop technical and empirical knowledge in
forms accessible to lay deliberators. 19 James Fishkin has developed a
model for this kind of expertise, and it has performed impressively in
various "deliberative polling" events.20
Moreover, in a manner Dewey foresaw, much recent
Experimentalist practice undermines traditional claims of expertise by
defining the qualifications of professional participants more in terms of
experience with problems than in terms credentials in intellectual
disciplines. For example, the Association of Drug Court Professionals,
whose members play an important role in court-annexed drug-treatment
regimes, includes lawyers, social workers, doctors, nurses, and
psychologists. 2' In social-service practice, decisions are increasingly
made, not by a particular professional, but by interdisciplinary teams.
Even without lay stakeholders, the need to explain a position in such a
cognitively diverse group diminishes the ability to appeal for deference
to credentials or professional position.
The critics are correct that "informalization" presents obstacles to
democratic accountability. If decisions rest on tacit, ineffable
considerations, it is much harder to assess them. But in associating new
governance with informalization, the critics ignore a major innovation
that cuts across the most promising new governance reforms. These
reforms reject the hierarchy and rigidity associated with formalization,
but they also reject the kind of tacit, low-visibility decision-making
implied by informalization. The most promising new governance
reforms insist that both particular decisions and general norms be as

Mark Dawson, Transforming Into What? New Governance in the EU and
18.
the "ManagerialSensibility" in Modern Law, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 389.
DEWEY, supranote 2, at 123-28, 148-71.
19.
20.
FISHKIN, supra note 14, at 106-58.
21.
Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 859 (2000).
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explicit as possible. They, in fact, adopt a kind of formalization, though
its role is different from the one it plays in traditional liberal theory.
The role of formalization in traditional liberal theory is to constrain
decision-making to terms laid down authoritatively in the past. The role
of formalization in new governance is to make practice transparent.
Thus, in new governance, rules do not constrain when following
them would not serve their underlying purposes. But any departure
from the rules triggers some accountability process-as they say in the
EU, "comply or explain." Ideally, if the rule departure is sustained, the
rules get rewritten immediately. This kind of formalization avoids the
twin dangers of traditional formalization-the tendencies on the one
hand to constrain decisions in unforeseen and counterproductive ways
and on the other to mask low-visibility rule departures that superiors
must tolerate either because they lack the resources to detect them or
because the system would collapse if the rules were consistently
enforced.
The suspicion that new governance compromises democracy seems
to arise from a traditional but debatable conception of democracy.
Tradition identifies democracy with fidelity to the will of a unitary
public expressed through elected representatives in terms of rules
faithfully implemented by administrative and judicial officials. As new
governance critics would probably be the first to point out themselves
in other moods, this idea has serious limitations. For one thing, the
"people" assert their will only in a crude and ambiguous form in
representative elections, where candidates are only vaguely associated
with issues and issues are massively bundled. For another, this
structure exempts from accountability a vast range of government
action. Locke made this clear from the beginning in designating most of
what we think of as executive action "prerogative."22
The range of executive action, of course, has been vastly extended
with the modern growth of the administrative state. Modern
administrative law has adapted by attempting to provide quasilegislative accountability for administrative rulemaking and extending
rights to quasi-judicial and judicial hearing to an expanded range of
citizen interests. But as Michael Wilkinson notes, a vast range of
administrative action is either explicitly or effectively immune from any
form of legal accountability.23 Administrative law is basically
"Schmittian" with respect to the national security state-it explicitly
exempts most relevant executive action from conventional legal
22.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 393 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1960) (1689).
23.
Michael Wilkinson, Tree Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence
of DemocraticExperimentalism, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 673.
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accountability. 24 Government decisions not to enforce law in the
criminal, civil, and regulatory spheres or not to intervene to protect
vulnerable people are extremely difficult to challenge. And even with
many decisions that are formally subject to hearing rights, the rights
often have little practical use to citizens who lack the knowledge and
resources to make use of them. A key problem here is that the core
mechanisms of accountability in traditional liberalism-rulemaking
proceedings and trial-type hearings triggered by individuals-are
neither available nor appropriate for much of what the modem state
does.
Those who value democracy should thus be grateful that new
governance has made available new modes of accountability that are
feasible across an extended range of government activity, including the
part previously exempt. The new governance demand on administrators
to articulately and transparently explain and justify their conduct and
submit to various forms of performance measurement and peer review
can be applied in areas where the need for executive discretion has been
thought to require immunity and it can be applied to conduct of public
importance that does not take the form of rulemaking and may not
trigger individual hearing rights.
Such demands potentially enhance accountability in two ways.
First, to the extent that the process succeeds in meaningfully involving
interested stakeholders, it affords a richer and more effective form of
democratic participation on the relevant issues than is possible through
voting in general elections. Second, the processes of transparent selfassessment and peer review leverage judicial and legislative
accountability. They make administrative practice transparent to the
legislature and the courts in a way that the traditional regime of rigid
and erratically enforced formal rules could not.

24.
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schrmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L.
REv. 1095 (2009).

